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Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the 
Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions 
CHARLES M. CAMERON Columbia University 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL SUNY at Stony Brook 
DONALD SONGER University of South Carolina 
W T He examine how the Supreme Court uses signals and indices from lower courts to determine which 
cases to review. In our game theoretic model, a higher court cues from publicly observable case 
facts, the known preferences of a lower court, and its decision. The lower court attempts to enforce 
its own preferences, exploiting ambiguity in cases'fact patterns. In equilibrium, a conservative higher court 
declines to review conservative decisions from lower courts regardless of the facts of the case or the relative 
ideology of the judges. But a conservative higher court probabilistically reviews liberal decisions, with the 
"audit rate" tied to observable facts and the ideology of the lower court judge. We derive comparative static 
results and test them with a random sample of search-and-seizure cases appealed to the Burger Court 
between 1972 and 1986. The evidence broadly supports the model. 
H ierarchical control of organizations is problem- 
atic throughout the realm of politics. Congress 
and presidents attempt to control agencies, 
upper levels of bureaucracies attempt to control lower 
levels, and higher courts strive to control lower courts. 
With incomplete information about their subordinates' 
decisions and knowledge, superiors in rule-based hier- 
archies often employ some form of auditing. In this 
article we study how the Supreme Court uses signals 
and indices from lower courts to pluck a relative 
handful of cases from a plethora of potential candi- 
dates for review. Our point of departure is the role of 
review in enforcing the doctrinal preferences of the 
Supreme Court within the judicial hierarchy. 
We begin by presenting a game-theoretic model of 
the Court's certiorari process. The model goes much 
farther than earlier efforts to incorporate concepts 
commonly employed by judicial scholars. For example, 
we include the legal- concepts of case facts, doctrine, 
and holding; formalize the attitudinal model; and 
include an explicit role for judicial culture. Most im- 
portant, the model puts asymmetric information at its 
analytic center, following the hints in recent empirical 
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studies based on interviews with justices of the Su- 
preme Court and their clerks (Perry 1991). 
The model explains several well-established patterns 
in certiorari, such as the importance of amicus briefs by 
the Solicitor General. It also generates several entirely 
new and nonobvious predictions. We test the predic- 
tions on a random sample of 274 decisions in the area 
of-search-and-seizure law heard in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals and appealed to the Supreme Court during 
the Burger years. The data strongly display the patterns 
predicted by the model. Thus, in addition to contrib- 
uting to the certiorari literature, we hope to advance 
the burgeoning literature on the strategic behavior of 
courts (e.g., Caldeira and Wright 1988; Epstein and 
Knight 1998; Hall 1992). 
The article is organized as follows. We first discuss 
the role of information in the certiorari process and the 
place of certiorari decisions in the incentive system of 
the judicial hierarchy. We then present the formal 
model, followed by the empirical analysis. We next 
discuss the implications of the findings and offer con- 
clusions in the final section. All proofs are gathered in 
the Appendix. 
INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES IN THE 
CERTIORARI PROCESS 
The Supreme Court's decision to hear a case-in legal 
parlance, to grant certiorari-is perhaps the best stud- 
ied area of the high court's decision making. A full 
review of the literature is outside the scope of this 
article and is unnecessary here, but it is helpful to 
review several major themes relevant to these deci- 
sions.' 
1 The Supreme Court uses the Rule of Four to grant certiorari, but 
a majority is necessary to prevail on the merits. Presumably, forward- 
thinking justices take the latter into account when voting to grant 
certiorari. Absent a careful analysis of the strategic properties of the 
Rule of Four (to the best of our knowledge, no formal model of this 
procedure has appeared in print), we treat the Court as a unitary 
actor with respect to the lower courts. 
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Certiorari and Incentives in the Judicial 
Hierarchy 
Certiorari and Interactive Incentives. The certiorari 
system creates incentives for upper and lower courts 
alike. One cannot get very far with a deductive theory 
of certiorari without thinking about those incentives, 
but a strange feature of the contemporary field of 
judicial politics is that the literatures on certiorari 
decisions and judicial compliance have developed 
largely independently. Most of the empirical studies of 
certiorari decisions ignore doctrinal deviations by 
lower courts (we note some exceptions below). In turn, 
empirical studies of the responsiveness of lower courts 
to Supreme Court precedent typically ignore review 
probabilities. In other words, there has been scant 
appreciation of the fact that the certiorari process 
creates an interactive incentive system between higher 
and lower courts, with the behavior of appellate courts 
affecting the behavior of the Supreme Court and vice 
versa. 
A partial exception is the empirical work of Ulmer 
(1984), who used conflict with Supreme Court prece- 
dent as a predictor of certiorari, although he did not 
recognize that the probability of certiorari is apt to 
affect conflict with precedent. Ulmer noted that coun- 
sel for appellants seem to believe conflict with prece- 
dent galvanizes the Court into granting certiorari be- 
cause such conflict is claimed in more than half of all 
petitions (six or more conflicts were claimed in more 
than 10% of the petitions). Attorneys may try to 
manipulate this cue by padding their claims about 
conflicts, so Ulmer tried to classify his sample into 
cases that do and do not contain "real" conflict with 
precedent. Using this distinction, he found that actual 
conflict is the single most important variable for un- 
derstanding grants of certiorari; it explains a higher 
proportion of the variance than any of the other cues 
noted by Tanenhaus et al. (1963) and other scholars. 
Ulmer's subjective coding of conflict is not amenable 
to replication, however. Moreover, his analysis puts 
dated precedents and more recent ones on a par 
although lower courts almost certainly defer more 
conscientiously to the preferences of the contempora- 
neous Court. Finally, Ulmer's dichotomization of real 
conflict leaves little room for nuance. Many scholars 
recognize that conflict involves subtle gradations of 
noncompliance (Feeney 1975). Nonetheless, one can- 
not read Ulmer's analysis without becoming aware of 
certiorari as a tool for policing the doctrinal decisions 
of lower courts. 
Even if one accepts that certiorari creates an inter- 
active incentive system, formalizing a model of it 
requires answers to two more questions. What does 
doctrinal compliance really mean? What sanctions and 
rewards are available to the Supreme Court if it detects 
noncompliance? 
Doctrinal Compliance. The concept of a legal doctrine 
is central to the process of legal reasoning. What is a 
legal doctrine, and what does it mean to comply with a 
doctrine? We take as fundamental the conception 
implicit in classic descriptions of legal reasoning (e.g., 
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Levi 1948): A legal doctrine indicates which fact situ- 
ations are to be grouped together and treated similarly. 
In other words, it creates a set of equivalence classes in 
a fact or case space (Kornhauser 1992). When a lower 
court conforms to a legal doctrine, it accepts the 
equivalence classes defined by the higher court and acts 
in accordance with them. Nonconformity means that 
the lower court treats the case inappropriately for the 
class to which the case belongs. This concept of doc- 
trine can be seen as an example of the broader notion 
of rule-governed behavior, a phenomenon general to 
bureaucracies. We formalize (part of) these concep- 
tions of doctrine and doctrinal compliance below and 
employ them in the empirical analysis. 
Sticks, Carrots, and Culture. What sanctions or re- 
wards can a higher court bring to bear on lower courts 
that do not comply with its doctrine? In the American 
system of jurisprudence, the formal answer is "very 
few." Higher courts cannot promote, demote, or fire; 
they cannot cut salaries, give bonuses, or offer stock 
options. Thus, the Supreme Court possesses none of 
the motivational tools typically employed by hierarchi- 
cal superiors. This is one of the most striking features 
of the federal judiciary considered as a hierarchical 
organization. 
A focus on traditional motivational tools is too 
constricted a view of judges, however. In fact, two 
sources of control are available to higher courts. First, 
lower courts care about the disposition of cases: They 
wish to see justice done, at least as they conceive it. If 
a higher court reverses the decision of a lower court, 
the latter may well view the ultimate disposition of the 
case as much less attractive than if its judgment had 
stood. Hence, reversal itself can be a kind of sanction, 
at least for judges who care about the disposition of 
cases. Second, informal sanctions supplement the for- 
mal rules. "Judicial culture" famously includes a desire 
to avoid reversals. Frequent reversals bring the deri- 
sion of colleagues and a decline in professional status. 
Higher courts are well aware of this sanctioning power. 
For example, Perry (1991, 267) notes that Supreme 
Court clerks "frequently talked about the need to 'slap 
the wrist' of a judge below." The importance of judicial 
culture should not be surprising. Federal judges belong 
to a very special and relatively close-knit society, and 
their informal culture is apt to affect their decisions. 
Enforcing Doctrine Versus Creating Doctrine. Our 
model stresses the role of certiorari in enforcing doc- 
trine, but this is a very partial view of the process. 
Perhaps equally important is the selection of cases as 
vehicles for creating new doctrine, for example, in 
novel fact situations. These often occur in the context 
of intercircuit conflict, when different circuits take 
different positions on new issues, which the Court must 
then answer. Indeed, the incremental, fact-soaked cre- 
ation of new rules is one of the most interesting and 
distinctive elements of judicial politics. The justices' 
emphasis on finding "good" cases and "well-percolat- 
ed" cases underscores this important part of the cer- 
tiorari process (Perry 1991, chap. 8). In addition, the 
model ignores aggressive grants, that is, situations in 
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which the Supreme Court grants certiorari in order to 
affirm a lower court decision and make it binding on 
the entire nation.2 
We defend the approach we take by noting that law 
creation is an important part of certiorari, but model- 
ing it involves even more complex theoretical issues 
than the enforcement of doctrine, which is our focus. 
The development and testing of a rigorous theory of 
doctrinal enforcement is an important step toward a 
more general theory of the judicial hierarchy. 
Structure of the Hierarchy. Our analysis simplifies the 
judicial structure into upper and lower courts. In 
reality, the federal judicial hierarchy has three levels, 
and courts at the first level play an important role in 
fact-finding. Our simplified structure enables us to 
explore the essential principal-agent dilemma. Exten- 
sions to this model could examine additional features 
of the judicial hierarchy, such as the special role of trial 
courts. 
Information and Certiorari 
From "Cue Theory" to Strategic Manipulation. Political 
scientists have long recognized the central importance 
of information in the Supreme Court's certiorari pro- 
cess. Tanenhaus et al. (1963) argue that the Court must 
economize in its search for information, since each 
year it is confronted with a blizzard of cases and tens of 
thousands of pages of documents. In particular, they 
argue, the Court is apt to rely heavily on easily distin- 
guishable but highly informative "cues," such as splits 
in the lower court, to winnow out the potential cases of 
interest. 
Tanenhaus's cue theory, as it came to be known, 
provoked a flurry of empirical work that continues to 
this day. Studies tried to determine which cues the 
Court uses (if any), whether cues are dispositive or 
merely suggestive, and whether the Court's use of cues 
changes over time- (Armstrong and Johnson 1982; 
Teger and Kosinski 1980). Development of the under- 
lying theory of information acquisition received little 
attention, however. Consequently, scholars largely ig- 
nored the strategic manipulation of cues, although they 
soon recognized the importance of reputation in the 
behavior of the Solicitor General (Caldeira and Wright 
1988; Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984). 
The neglect of the strategic dimension of cue theory 
began to change when Caldeira and Wright (1988) 
demonstrated the effect of amicus briefs on the prob- 
ability of granting certiorari.3 When coupled with new 
findings about the litigation strategies of interest 
groups, Caldeira and Wright's finding strongly suggests 
that at least one cue, the presence of an amicus brief, 
2 Overall, 23.3% of the search-and-seizure cases were affirmed by the 
Burger Court (U.S. Supreme Court database, using orally argued 
citation and split vote as the unit of analysis). Some of these 
affirmations may be consistent with our model. That is, because of 
differences between the observed and actual intrusiveness of the 
search, the Court may take a case that seems suspect only to find on 
further review that it was correctly decided. 
3 Cue theory aside, strategic analyses of certiorari date to Schubert 
1959; also see Brenner 1979. 
is deliberately manipulated by interested parties in 
order to affect the behavior of the Court (Epstein 
1991). This move to greater theoretical sophistication 
continued in Perry's (1991) landmark study of the 
certiorari process. Perry adopted concepts from Jervis's 
(1970) classic work on signaling in international rela- 
tions, including the distinction between signals, which 
are manipulable, and indices, which are not. Nonethe- 
less, Perry did not address many of the issues that 
occupy center stage in game-theoretic accounts of 
signaling. 
Meaning and credibility in certiorari signaling. Con- 
temporary signaling theory revolves around two issues: 
meaning and credibility (Banks 1991; Farrell 1993). 
With respect to meaning, the key issues are the identity 
of the signal sender, the nature of his or her private 
information, and the interpretation of the message by 
the signal receiver. In the context of certiorari, the 
obvious questions are: Who is the signaler? What does 
the signaler know that the Supreme Court does not? 
What signals might reflect this private information? 
How can the Court understand or interpret the signal? 
With respect to credibility, the key issue is sometimes 
called "the Jervis paradox": If sending a particular 
message benefits a signaler with private information, 
then why do not others without the information do the 
sajne thing? If they do, then why does this not destroy 
the credibility of the message? In the context of 
certiorari, if a lower court that follows Supreme Court 
doctrine can signal its conformance by sending a 
particular message, then why do not courts who flout 
doctrine send the same signal? If they do, how can the 
signal from the first court credibly convey the intended 
message: "There is no need to review me since I am 
conforming to your doctrine"? The contemporary the- 
ory of signaling games provides powerful tools for 
answering these questions. 
A JUDICIAL SIGNALING GAME 
The Model 
Our model shares some similarities with other auditing 
models in the social sciences, such as the importance of 
mixed strategy equilibria, but its structure differs from 
most others in three ways: It includes a publicly observ- 
able index, the message space for the signaler is 
restricted to two actions, and both actors agree about 
the disposition of some cases even when they differ 
strongly about others. Consequently, the equilibria in 
our model also differ in some regards from most others 
(for a review of those models and their characteristics, 
see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998). 
The players are higher court H and lower court L. 
Play of the game determines the legal disposition of a 
search-and-seizure case. A "case" is a set of facts (i.e., 
a point in a fact space). Each point in the fact space 
corresponds to a degree of intrusiveness of the search. 
That is, points in the fact space map into the real line 
X, where each point x indicates a degree of intrusive- 
ness. Each case thus corresponds to a point x in X. 
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Some of the facts in a case are publicly observable, 
others are not. For example, it is easily determined 
whether a search took place in a car or home, or 
whether a warrant was issued; whether the police had 
"probable cause" for the search is a more difficult 
determination that can only be reached after careful 
review of evidence and testimony. 
Let x = x + t, where x is the intrusiveness of the case 
based on the publicly observed facts, and t is an 
additional increment or decrement of intrusiveness 
based on the nonpublicly observable facts. We assume 
t E T = X and is distributed according to distribution 
F, with common knowledge density f assumed every- 
where continuous, differentiable, and nonzero. We 
assume throughout that F is log concave (displays the 
monotone hazard rate property). This condition is met 
by most common probability distributions, including 
the normal, logistic, chi-squared, exponential, and 
Laplace (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 1989). We further 
assume the density f(t) is independent of the realiza- 
tion of x. 
Sequence of Play, Information Structure, and Strategies. 
The lower court hears the case, learns all the facts in 
the matter (i.e., it learns x and t and hence x), and 
either admits or excludes the evidence. The higher 
court sees only the publicly observable facts (i.e., it 
learns x but not t) and the decision of the lower court. 
H may deny certiorari (i.e., decline to review the case), 
and L's decision stands. Or, at cost k, H may review the 
case, learn the private information t, and affirm or 
reverse L. 
Given this information structure, the action of L 
becomes a "signal" about its private information, ex- 
actly as noted by Songer (1979), while the publicly 
observable degree of intrusiveness becomes an "index" 
in Perry's terminology. 
A strategy for L is a function 
s:T XKX ->z(M), 
where zXQ) denotes the set of probability distributions 
over a finite set, and M = {ml, m2}, with m1 = 
exclude and m2 = admit. Thus, s (t; x) gives the 
probability of excluding the evidence given the private 
information t and the public information x. 
If H hears the case it will affirm or reverse L in such 
a way that the evidence is admitted or excluded accord- 
ing to its own preferred doctrine. Hence, we can take 
H's strategy as simply a reviewing or auditing strategy: 
r : M X X i\ A(A), 
where A = {a,, a2}, with a1 = grant certiorari and a2 
= deny certiorari. Thus, r(nmi; x) is the probability of 
granting certiorari given action mi by L and the 
observable degree of intrusiveness x. 
Preferences. Both courts have preferences defined 
partly in relation to the ultimate disposition of the case. 
Each wishes the case to be adjudicated correctly, given 
its own notions of justice. More specifically, each has a 
preferred legal rule, which uses a cut-point xi in X, i - 
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H, L. Court i believes the evidence should be excluded 
in cases that are more intrusive than xi and admitted in 
cases less intrusive than xi. This captures the notion of 
a legal rule or doctrine and the "correct" versus 
"incorrect" dispositions of cases, concepts of critical 
importance in the judicial setting. Each court wishes to 
decide cases correctly in view of its preferred legal rule. 
Note, however, that the two courts differ in the value of 
the ideal doctrinal cut-point. The reason courts prefer 
different legal rules is not modeled here, but it could 
result, for example, from different perceptions of the 
social costs and benefits of curbing the police. 
The unidimensional space X is exactly the "attitude" 
space of the "attitudinal model" assumed in many 
empirical studies of judicial decision making (Segal and 
Spaeth 1993). The ideal cut-point partitions the space 
in precisely the fashion noted in attitudinal studies. 
This partitioning, combined with the mapping from the 
n-dimensional fact space into the unidimensional atti- 
tude space, in turn partitions the fact space in exactly 
the way required by the concept of a judicial doctrine. 
Conveniently, however, most of the action of the model 
takes place in the simple attitude space. 
To complete the specification of the doctrinal com- 
ponent of preferences, we normalize each player's 
payoffs. If a case is decided correctly from its perspec- 
tive, then the court receives a payoff of 0; if incorrectly, 
the payoff is -1. This stylization reflects the different 
value of a correct versus an incorrect decision to the 
courts while simplifying the development and exposi- 
tion of the model. In the interest of brevity and clarity 
in presentation, we take XL < XH SO that H is more 
conservative than L; results concerning the other, 
completely symmetrical, case are noted where appro- 
priate. 
In addition to preferences about outcomes, L prefers 
not to be reversed. If reversed, it suffers an ? > 0 utility 
loss; this loss reflects the influence of judicial culture. 
We do not try to account for the origin or maintenance 
of this loss, although one can view it as sustained 
through repeated play within the legal community. 
Finally, the higher court loses k E (0, 1) if it hears the 
case.4 This auditing cost reflects the time and effort of 
hearing the case, which involves a cost in other cases 
unheard and in leisure and other activities forgone. 
Given the normalization of the payoffs, ? and k can be 
seen as the utility losses from reversal and auditing 
relative to the utility loss of an incorrectly decided case. 
The utility function for the higher court is thus: 
UH 
fX <XH and m = admit and a = deny 
X XHand m = exclude and a i deny 
X < XH and m = exclude and a = deny 
?X XH and m = admit and a = deny 
-k if a = grant 
4 We bound the auditing cost by 1; otherwise, the higher court would 
never find it profitable to review cases (since the most it can gain as 
a result, exclusive of the auditing cost, is 1). 
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and for the lower court: 
UL 
IX <XL and m = admit 
O if XL < X < XH and m = exclude and a = deny 
(X 2 XH and m = exclude 
(X <XL and m = exclude and a = deny 
= -1 if XL x X<XHand m = admit 
LX 2? XH and m = admit and a = deny 
-1 - C if XL < X < XH and m = exclude and a = grant 
I X <XL and m = exclude and a = grant 
-? if 
X 2 XH and m = admit and a = grant 
Expected Utilities and Best Responses. The expected 
utility for the lower court from strategy s (t; x) follows 
straightforwardly: 
UL(s(t; 0)) 
s (t; x^)[r(mj; x) ( 1- -1] if X < XL 
= (t; x)- r(mi; x)(1 + 0)] - 1 if XL ?X <XH 
(1 - s(t; x))[r(m2; ) (1 - O- 1 ] if x ' XH. 
L's best-response correspondence is immediate: 
BRL(r(m; x^), t; x^) 
(X <XL 
S(t; f)=O0 ifX 
L 
?XL < X < XH and r(m1; ) > P 
= s(t; 0) E [0, 1] if XL < X < XH and r(mi; x) = p 
fX ? XH 
s(t;X) = 1 if 
:-  
xXL ? X < XH and r(m1; 0) < p, 
where p 1/(1 + 4 
L's best response correspondence indicates there are 
three strategically distinct regions in X: the region 
below XL, the region between XL (inclusive) and XH, 
and the region above XH (inclusive). If x falls into the 
first region, then L always admits the evidence; if x falls 
into the third region, then L always excludes the 
evidence; if x falls into the second region, the "conflict 
region," then L admits or excludes the evidence de- 
pending on whether the probability of certiorari (given 
exclusion and the observable facts) falls above or below 
a critical value p. If x falls into the conflict region and 
the probability of certiorari equals p, then L is indif- 
ferent between admitting and excluding the evidence 
and may randomize between the two pure strategies in 
any fashion. 
This best-response correspondence is quite intuitive. 
The interests of the two players correspond when x is 
very high or very low (i.e., at or above H's ideal 
cut-point or below L's). Therefore, when x falls into 
those regions L can pursue her ideal policy without 
fear of reversal, yielding L a best response that is 
invariant to H's strategy. When x falls into the conflict 
region, the interests of the players are opposed. In this 
case, a sufficiently imposing chance of reversal will 
keep L from pursuing her ideal policy. For cases that 
fall into the conflict region, the role of reversal costs is 
critical; as the cost of reversal falls to zero, the proba- 
bility of an audit must go to one if the lower court is to 
be dissuaded from implementing its own preferred 
doctrine. 
Finally, note that for any set of observable facts x it 
is possible for L to have the best response "admit" or 
"exclude" (since by assumption F(ta) > 0 and 1 - 
F(tb) > 0, where ta XL - X and tb XH. -). This 
has an important implication: All information sets can 
be reached in equilibrium, so the need to determine 
beliefs at unreached information sets does not arise. 
Let [>(x; m , x) denote H's beliefs about x given the 
observable facts x, L's action m , and L's strategy. For 
example, >(x < XH; admit, x') indicates thelprobability 
H puts on x lying below XH after observing "admit" in 
a case with observable obtrusiveness x'. The following 
fact is important: Given L's best-response correspon- 
dence, H's beliefs about x must be concentrated on the 
region belowxH after having observed "admit," regard- 
less of the value of x. Therefore, after observing 
"admit," the expected utility to H of review strategy 
r(admit, x) must be -r( )k. This expression is maxi- 
mized at r(admit, x) = 0 for all x. Accordingly, in any 
equilibrium, r(admit; x) = 0 for all x. 
In addition, given L's best-response correspondence, 
H's belief about x must be concentrated above XL 
following the observation of "exclude," regardless of 
the value of x. Recall that the payoff to H from denying 
certiorari given exclusion is zero if x - XH but -1 if x < 
XH. Therefore, following the observation of "exclude," 
the expected utility to H of review strategy r(exclude, x) 
is for all x 
-r(exclude, x)k - (1 - r(exclude, X))P(XL ? X 
< XH, exclude, x), (1) 
where, from Bayes's rule, 
>.(XL < X < XH, exclude, x) 
tb 
I s(Q + t)f(t)dt 
ta 
rtb 
1 -F(tb) + s + t)f(t) dt 
ta 
(recall thatXL = x + ta and XH = X + tb). The solution 
to maximizing expression 1 with respect to r(exclude, x) 
depends on the relative magnitudes of k and V(xL ? 
X < XH, exclude, x). Thus, in any equilibrium, for all x 
r1 if >L(XL ?X < XH) > k 
r(exclude; x) = Ot E [0, 1] if >.(XL-X <XH) = k 
10 if (XL ' X <H) < k. 
(2) 
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Equilibria 
We seek perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) to the 
judicial signaling game. In doing so it is convenient to 
consider a level of x, x*, such that H's posterior belief 
about the true location of the case, given observed x 
and "exclude" by L, leave him just indifferent between 
granting and denying certiorari, even if L definitely 
excludes the evidence for all cases truly lying in the 
conflict region (i.e., even if s(t, x) = 1 V x E [XL, XH)). 
Using the middle part of equation 2 and Bayes's rule, 
x is implicitly defined as the level of x such that 
F(tb) - F(ta) =k 3 
1 -F(ta) 
Note that x* may not exist if k is sufficiently large, that 
is, if the left-hand quantity in equation 3 is less than k 
for all values of X. If x* does exist, then the assumption 
of log concavity of FQ) assures that it will be unique. 
PROPOSITION 1. 
1. If x* does not exist, then the following is a unique 
PBE: 
0O if x < XL 
s(t, ) = 1 otherwise 
r(m, x) = O V m and V x 
and beliefs are determined everywhere by Bayes's 
rule. 
2. If x* exists, then the PBE are characterized by: 
s*(t, x) 
(X XH 
>f {x-XLand x-x* 
- (t, k) E [0, 1] such that >(xL < X < XH, exclude, 
x) = k if xL x < xHand x < x* 
O if x < XL 
1 if xf < x* and mi = exclude 
r* (mik) =t m= 
r*(mi, ~ x) (x-x and mi = exclude 
f 
mi = admit 
and beliefs are determined everywhere by Bayes's 
rule.5 
Part 2 of the proposition allows a great deal of 
latitude in admissable strategies for L. The latitude 
arises for cases whose observable intrusiveness is below 
x and whose true location lies within the conflict 
region. Hence, part 2 describes many equilibria. In all 
these equilibria, however, H's posterior belief that x 
lies in the conflict region, after observing "exclude" and 
x, must exactly equal k. In this sense, all of L's 
strategies characterized in part 2 can be said to be 
5 Recall that the proposition assumes the higher court is more 
conservative than the lower court. There is a "mirror" proposition 
when the higher court is more liberal than the lower court. 
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"belief equivalent." All would be observationally equiv- 
alent to an outside observer not privy to t. 
Example. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the review 
equilibria in part 2 of the proposition is through an 
example. SupposeXL = OXH = 1, k = 1/2, e = 1/2, and 
f is a normal distribution with mean zero and standard 
deviation 1. In this example, if x < x, then s(t, x) = 
s(t', x) V x E [XL, XH). In other words, if a case lies in 
the conflict region and x' x* , then L keys the 
probability of excluding the evidence only on the case's 
observed intrusiveness. 
Consider the strategy of the lower court, shown in 
the left-hand panel of Figure 1. If x < XL or x XH, 
then the lower court has obvious actions regardless of 
the value of x. Whenx < XL, the lower court admits the 
evidence; when x - XH, the lower court definitely 
excludes the evidence. It can do so because even if 
audited it will not be reversed. If x falls into the conflict 
region, then L's strategy depends on the value of x, the 
publicly observable level of intrusiveness. When x is 
sufficiently high, at or above the critical level x* (which 
can be calculated to be about .69 in this example), the 
high court will not review the case even given exclusion 
of the evidence, for reasons explained below. Given 
this, the lower court can implement its preferred 
doctrine and exclude the evidence. When x is lower 
than x*, the lower court uses a probabilistic strategy 
keyed to the observable facts. For instance, when x = 
.3, the probability of excluding the evidence is about 
.64. 
Now consider the strategy of the higher court. If it 
observes the admission of the evidence, then it accepts 
the lower court's judgment. This follows from the fact 
that L is more liberal than H, so any evidence it finds 
admissible will surely be found admissible by H as well. 
The higher court has a more difficult decision if it 
observes the exclusion of the evidence (the right-hand 
panel of Figure 1). If the true situation is x - XH, then 
H would like L's judgment to stand and would prefer 
not to review the case. But if x < XH, then H would like 
to review the case and reverses L, even though grant- 
ing certiorari entails cost k. Unfortunately for the 
higher court, it can only observe x and the fact of 
exclusion. So, given the observable degree of intrusive- 
ness, the two ideal doctrinal cut-points, the cost of 
auditing, and the probability distribution F(t), the 
higher court must decide whether it is worthwhile to 
check the lower court after observing "exclude." When 
x is large enough (equal to or greater than x *), it will 
not be worthwhile; that is, the probability that x truly 
falls into the conflict region between the two doctrinal 
cut-points will not be large enough to warrant the 
audit. When x < x*, the higher court's calculation goes 
the other way. When H observes "exclude" from a 
liberal lower court, it employs a probabilistic auditing 
strategy keyed to the value of ?. In this case, the 
probability of granting certiorari after observing "ex- 
clude" is 2/3. 
These strategies of the two players together deter- 
mine outcomes. For example, if the liberal lower court 
admits the evidence, then the higher court does not 
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grant certiorari, and the lower court's decision stands. 
If the lower court excludes the evidence and x < .69, 
then the higher court grants certiorari with a 2/3 chance. 
In the event of certiorari, if x actually falls in the 
conflict region, then H reverses L; if it does not fall in 
that region, then H affirms. (Note that the model 
predicts some grants and affirms as well as grants and 
reversals.) For instance, when x falls into the conflict 
region and x = .2, L admits the evidence with a 42% 
chance and excludes it with a 58% chance; if it ex- 
cludes, then H denies certiorari with a 33% chance, so 
the judgment stands, and grants certiorari with a 67% 
chance; if it so grants, then H reverses L. Finally, when 
x - .69, L decides the case according to its own 
preferred doctrine, and H always denies certiorari, 
even if L excluded the evidence. 
Meaning and Credibility. How do meaning and credi- 
bility play out in the model? The signals "admit" or 
"exclude" are inherently ambiguous, since x lies on a 
continuum, but the messages are dichotomous (i.e., the 
most informative equilibrium can only be a partial 
pooling equilibrium). Because L is liberal, however, 
the meaning of the signal "admit" (i.e., x < XH) is 
sufficiently clear to make H's decision easy, provided 
the message is credible; indeed, the message is per- 
fectly credible when L is more liberal than H. The 
signal "exclude" from L is also ambiguous, with more 
serious ramifications for H. A liberal lower court 
always (weakly) prefers the higher court to interpret 
"exclude" as meaning x ? XH, but this interpretation 
cannot be inherently credible because of the potential 
tension between the two courts. Instead, H uses an 
index, the observable degree of intrusiveness, to judge 
the message credibility: If the observable facts indicate 
intrusiveness above the critical threshold x *, then the 
interpretation x > XH iS sufficiently credible to warrant 
accepting L's decision. If not, then H will occasionally 
audit L. The audit rate will be keyed to the lower 
court's sensitivity to reversals, and sensitive courts will 
be audited less frequently than insensitive ones. 
Hypotheses about Review 
Because the model treats certiorari as part of an 
interactive incentive system, it generates hypotheses 
not only about the probability of review but also about 
the exclusion of evidence in the lower court. Both types 
of hypotheses can be used to test the model; because 
our primary interest is the certiorari decision, we focus 
on the former. 
The first two hypotheses follow straightforwardly 
from the propositions but make explicit the conse- 
quences of a lower court that is more conservative than 
the higher court. 
HYPOTHESIS 1 (liberal admission or conservative exclu- 
sion). The probability the higher court grants certiorari 
is zero if XL < XH and the lower court admits the 
evidence, or XL > XH and the lower court excludes the 
evidence. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (liberal exclusion or conservative admis- 
sion). (a) If XL < XH and the lower court excludes the 
evidence, then the probability the higher court grants 
certiorari is zero only if the search is sufficiently intru- 
sive (kx-*); (b) if XL > xH and the lower court admits 
the evidence, then the probability the higher court 
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grants certiorari is zero only if the search is sufficiently 
unintrusive (k < x*). 
A striking feature of these hypotheses, which are 
new to the literature, is the way the higher court's 
behavior depends on the lower court preferences rela- 
tive to the higher court. The asymmetry of H's response 
to, say, "admit" arises because the meaning of the 
signal depends on the nature of the sender (a liberal or 
conservative lower court).6 These propositions-par- 
ticularly the first, which might be called the Nixon goes 
to China proposition-are strongly reminiscent of Cal- 
vert's (1985) work on the value of information from a 
biased source ("if a cold warrior like Nixon goes to 
China it must be time for a change in American 
policy"). 
Now consider two circuit courts, both more liberal 
than the Supreme Court but one less liberal than the 
other. How does the critical value of the index I *, the 
level of intrusiveness above which the Supreme Court 
does not review even following "exclude," differ for the 
two courts? This question is answered by the third 
hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (proximity of lower court). Consider two 
lower courts. (a) If XL < xHfor both lower courts, then 
(i) the critical value x* is lower for the less liberal lower 
court, and (ii) the probability of review is (weakly) 
lower for that court given the same observable facts and 
actions. (b) If XL > XH for both lower courts, then (i) 
the critical value x* is lower for the more conservative 
lower court, and (ii) the probability of review is (weak- 
ly) greater for that court given the same observable facts 
and actions. 
Hypothesis 3 indicates that moving a lower court 
closer to the higher court expands the region in which 
cases escape review, a sensible result. Hypothesis 3 also 
indicates that if one estimates the probability of review 
as a function of observable facts and the ideological 
distance between the higher and lower court, then the 
coefficient on the distance between the two courts' 
ideologies should be positive. This hypothesis is new to 
the literature. 
HYPOTHESIS 4 (change in high court's preferences). (a) As 
the court becomes more conservative or more liberal, 
x moves in the same direction (e.g., if XH increases, 
then x* increases). Consequently, (b) as the higher 
court becomes more conservative, cases from liberal 
lower courts become (weakly) more likely to be re- 
viewed (controlling for observable facts), and cases 
from conservative lower courts become (weakly) less 
likely to be reviewed. 
6 Referring to Figure 1, it may seem plausible to strengthen hypoth- 
esis 2 so that the probability of review, if nonzero, is a constant with 
respect to observed facts. Yet, such a strengthening requires the 
additional assumption that e is not only uncorrelated with the 
distance between the courts but also identical across all lower courts. 
Whether the probability of review, when positive, varies with respect 
to observable facts can be seen as a test of this rather strong 
assumption. 
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Hypothesis 4 is closely related to hypothesis 3 and also 
seems quite sensible, although it is new to the litera- 
ture. 
One of the most established facts about certiorari is 
that amicus briefs and the involvement of the Solicitor 
General greatly increase the probability the Supreme 
Court will accept a case. A complete analysis of those 
two factors would require modeling third-party signal- 
ing and is beyond our scope here. In a somewhat 
similar model, however, Banks and Weingast (1992) 
note that third-party signals can be seen as reducing 
auditing costs. The following hypothesis considers the 
effects of changes in the cost of review. 
HYPOTHESIS 5 (change in the cost of review). A decrease 
in the cost of review (a) increases x* if XL < XH and 
decreases x* if XL > XH. Consequently, (b) the proba- 
bility of review (weakly) increases, controlling for ob- 
servable levels of intrusiveness. 
This hypothesis offers one reason amicus briefs or 
involvement of the Solicitor General may increase the 
probability of certiorari: They reduce information costs 
for the Supreme Court. 
Hypothesis 5 and the no-review equilibrium in part 1 
of proposition 1 have an interesting implication. When 
the Supreme Court has little interest in a technically 
demanding area (such as admiralty or patent law), the 
value of k will be large, and the Court will largely or 
entirely abandon that area. For instance, during the 
last 50 years the Court has only rarely heard admiralty 
cases, once a substantial portion of its caseload. Con- 
versely, when the Court has a substantial interest in a 
less technically demanding area (e.g., civil liberties), 
hypothesis 5 suggests it is likely to hear many such 
cases. The topic seems to act as a "cue" for the Court, 
though in fact the causal mechanism is not so much 
signaling as the magnitude of information costs relative 
to the possible gains from review. The importance of 
this type of cue is a recurrent finding in the literature. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data 
The data for this analysis were assembled as follows. As 
part of a larger project on circuit court decision 
making, we drew a random sample of U.S. Courts of 
Appeals search-and-seizure opinions (including per 
curiams) published in the Federal Reporter from 1961 
through 1990. We determined the universe of these 
cases by searching Westlaw (www.westlaw.com) for all 
"searches and seizures," all Fourth Amendment cases, 
and criminal law topics 219, 226, 364, 394, and 207, plus 
relevant combinations of keywords. From this universe 
we then drew a random sample stratified by year, 
consisting of 40 cases per year. Any that were not in 
fact search-and-seizure cases were discarded and re- 
placed with the next case from the universe. For years 
with less than 40 cases, all published cases were in- 
cluded in the sample. 
The original sample of more than 1,100 published 
appeals court decisions yielded only 18 cases reviewed 
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by the Supreme Court. This is not surprising, given the 
rarity of certiorari. Therefore, the next step was to add 
all other appeals court search-and-seizure cases re- 
viewed by the high court. Such a sample, known as a 
choice-based sample, is commonly used when the event 
of interest is rare. Special statistical techniques are 
required for such samples, to which we return shortly. 
Each case in the final sample was coded in various 
ways: whether the appeals court upheld or struck down 
the search, whether the case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, whether certiorari was granted, and so 
on. We also coded fact patterns for each case using the 
procedures employed by Segal (1984). The identity and 
votes of each judge on the appellate court panel were 
also recorded. Using the identity information, appeals 
court judges were matched with data on their personal 
background and characteristics (see Songer, Segal, and 
Cameron 1994). Characteristics were unavailable for 
some, since often district court judges and retired 
judges sit as the third member of appellate court 
panels. Personal characteristics were available for the 
lead judge in most of the cases, however. 
Our model indicates five key variables. The depen- 
dent variable is whether certiorari was granted (Grant). 
The independent variables are the signal, that is, 
whether the lower court admitted the evidence (Ad- 
mit); an index, the publicly observable intrusiveness of 
the search (Intrude); another index, the ideology of the 
lower court (Ji); and the ideology of the Supreme 
Court. 
Using the case facts, we constructed the measure of 
the publicly observable intrusiveness of the search in 
the following way. Segal (1984) estimates the likeli- 
hood the Supreme Court will uphold a search, based on 
the fact pattern in cases and a proxy for the ideology of 
the Court. In particular, Segal estimates weights on 
each variable using a logit regression. Since the Court's 
decision to uphold or strike down search-and-seizure 
cases depends partly on the intrusiveness involved, the 
logit weights on case facts provide a convenient way to 
measure intrusiveness.7 More specifically, we construct 
the variable intrude as follows: 
Int = -3.256 X Incident - 1.049 X Afterlaw + .06 
X Unlawful - 1.928 X Warrant + 3.25 X Home 
+ 2.054 X Person + 2.733 X Business + 2.243 
X Car - 1.411 X Except + 1.766 x Extent. 
The definitions for the case fact variables are identical 
to those of Segal (1984), but we reverse the sign on the 
variables, as we wish to measure intrusiveness rather 
than lack of it. We also do not employ the constant or 
Segal's proxy for Supreme Court ideology, since we 
wish to measure intrusiveness rather than probability 
of upholding or reversing. Furthermore, we do not 
7The following equation provides the mapping from fact space to 
attitude space discussed in the previous section. Whether this simple 
linear mapping is adequate to capture important doctrinal subtleties 
is an interesting question, but Segal's work demonstrates its empir- 
ical power. 
employ Segal's variable Probcaus, which indicates 
whether the lower court found probable cause for the 
search. We argue that, for the most part, findings about 
probable cause do not reflect publicly observable facts 
but the private information the lower court obtained 
through its scrutiny of the case. It is exactly in its 
determination of probable cause that a lower court can 
try to exploit its informational advantage to alter the 
outcome of a search-and-seizure case in its preferred 
direction. It is worth noting that lower court determi- 
nations of probable cause do not affect the Supreme 
Court's decision on the merits, according to Segal's 
analysis (i.e., the coefficient on this variable was not 
statistically different from zero). This makes perfect 
sense from an informational standpoint: Once the 
Supreme Court has heard a case, it can make its ruling 
based on its own knowledge of previously unobservable 
facts, not what the lower court says about them. 
We created a measure of the doctrinal preferences 
of the lower court in a two-step fashion, following 
Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994).8 First, we re- 
gressed the votes of the appellate judges on their 
background characteristics (e.g., whether they were 
appointed by a Republican president or were a prose- 
cutor before becoming a judge). The logit weights from 
this regression were used to form an index of conser- 
vatism for each judge for whom background informa- 
tion was available (low numbers on the index indicate 
a presumptively liberal judge; higher numbers a more 
conservative one).9 This is obviously far from perfect as 
a measure of doctrinal preferences. Nonetheless, pre- 
sumptively conservative judges, based on simple back- 
ground characteristics, tend to vote more often to 
uphold searches relative to presumptively liberal 
judges (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). Hence, the 
index has a degree of face validity. Thus, the first stage 
yields a measure of ideology for each judge on the 
three-judge appellate panel. 
The formal model assumes a single measure of 
ideology for a lower court, an abstraction adopted to 
simplify an already complex model. In the empirical 
analysis, however, we have to consider how the Su- 
preme Court may determine the ideology of the lower 
court judges. Several possibilities present themselves. 
Most obviously, the Court may cue off the ideology of 
the opinion writer (measured by our variable J1); we 
explore this possibility below. Or the Court may try to 
judge the general ideological tenor of the lower court, 
perhaps best reflected in the mean ideology of the 
judges in the majority. Alternatively, the Court may use 
its limited information very efficiently, cueing off the 
8 See Brace, Hall, and Langer 1998 and Giles, Hettinger, and 
Peppers 1998 for similar uses of regression-based techniques to 
impute judicial ideologies. 
9 The logit is .353 region - .311 appointingpresident + .381 religion + 
.189 prosecutor + .152 judicial experience, defined as: judge's region 
(1 = South, 0 = non-South), the appointing president's ideology (1 = 
liberal, 0 = moderate, -1 conservative [Tate and Handberg 
1991]), the judge's religion (1 Catholic, 0 = other), prosecutorial 
experience (1 = yes, 0 = no), and judicial experience (1 = yes, 0 = 
no). A simple index based on the number of presumptively conser- 
vative traits works almost as well as the multivariate regression in 
predicting votes of appellate judges. 
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most liberal judge in the majority in conservative 
decisions and the most conservative judge in the ma- 
jority in liberal decisions. Information about a dissent- 
ing judge, if any, also may be useful. Data limitations 
prevent a detailed analysis of these possibilities.10 
We control for the doctrinal preferences of the 
Supreme Court in a simple way: We restrict our 
attention to the last three natural courts (courts in 
which there are no personnel changes) of the Burger 
years (Burger Courts 3-5 in Table 5-2 of Epstein et al. 
1997). That is, we examine cases from January 7, 1972, 
to September 25, 1986 -from the addition to the Court 
of William Rehnquist up to the addition of Antonin 
Scalia-which yields 273 usable appealed cases. During 
this period, in the arena of criminal justice the domi- 
nant coalition on the Court was relatively stable and 
quite conservative. Moreover, the bulk of the appellate 
court panels that the high court faced were almost 
certainly more liberal than the Supreme Court, at least 
with respect to search and seizure." This makes the 
detection of relevant patterns in the data much easier. 
Method 
Hypotheses. The data allow us to address hypotheses 
1-3 in the signaling model. Since the Burger Court was 
almost certainly as conservative, if not more so, in 
search-and-seizure cases as most of the lower court 
panels it faced (Blasi 1983), the model predicts a series 
of patterns that are neatly captured in the conditioning 
plot shown in Figure 2. Such plots are powerful devices 
for detecting interactions or (as is relevant in this case) 
patterns across statistical regimes (Cleveland 1993). 
The plot is read in the following way. Each panel shows 
the relationship between the probability of granting 
certiorari and the intrusiveness of the search, under a 
specific condition. In the top two panels, the lower 
court admitted the evidence. In the bottom two panels, 
the lower court excluded the evidence. In the left-hand 
panels (top and bottom), the judge who wrote the 
opinion for the lower court was quite liberal. In the 
right-hand panels, the judge who wrote the opinion for 
the lower court was conservative (but, recall, less 
conservative than the Supreme Court). 
The signaling model predicts several patterns when 
the data are arranged in this fashion (Figure 2). The 
10 Because data on district court and retired judges sitting by 
designation were not available, more than one-third of our cases 
would have to be excluded if we were to use a composite measure of 
panel ideology. By focusing on the opinion writer, we cut missing 
data to below 10%. Moreover, it is not unrealistic to imagine that the 
Supreme Court cues off the opinion writer, especially as the justices' 
certiorari memos typically highlight his or her name. 
11 To test whether the Court's decisions remained stable under Chief 
Justice Burger, we added to the model dummy variables for each 
chief justice from Warren through Rehnquist (minus one for the 
excluded dummy) and an interaction for the presence of that chief 
justice and each passing term of the Court from 1962 through 1991. 
This, as we have previously shown, is the best measure of changing 
search-and-seizure doctrine between Courts. Nevertheless, if we look 
only within the Burger Court, we find that the coefficient for its 
interaction is 0.06, with a standard error of 0.05. Thus, we are 
reasonably confident in our assertion that under Burger, the Court's 
preferences remained stable. 
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top two panels should show a zero probability of review 
at all levels of intrusiveness: If the lower court took the 
conservative action, then the Burger Court should not 
review it (from hypothesis 1). The prediction for the 
lower panels is more complicated. Refer to the step 
function in the right-hand panel of Figure 1. The 
signaling model predicts such a step function in each of 
the lower panels of Figure 2, but it should be located 
farther to the right in the left-hand panel than in the 
right-hand panel (hypothesis 3.a.i.), and it may be 
beyond any level of intrusiveness actually observed. So, 
at any value of intrusiveness, the probability of review 
should be no greater in the lower right-hand panel than 
the lower left-hand panel (hypothesis 3.a.2). Finally, in 
the lower panels, if the probability of granting certio- 
rari approaches zero, it should do so only for high 
levels of intrusiveness (hypothesis 2). 
Choice-Based Sampling. The estimated models need 
to reflect the fact that the sample is choice based. This 
is easily done by weighting the observations (see Man- 
ski and Lerman 1977; Greene 1991, Section 36.5, 
provides a simple example). In the initial sample, the 
proportion of appealed cases actually heard by the 
Supreme Court was 5%. These were subsequently 
oversampled, so that they account for about 27% of the 
final sample. Consequently, cases granted appeal are 
overrepresented by .27/.05 = 5.4, and cases not granted 
review are underrepresented by .73/.95 = .77. To 
account for this, the granted cases need to be weighted 
by the factor .05/.27 = .19, and the rejected cases need 
to be weighted by the factor .95/.73 = 1.3. In all the 
models presented below, including the scatter plot 
smoothers, this procedure was followed. 
Data Display 
Figure 3 displays all the data in the form of the critical 
conditioning plot. Liberal lower courts are defined as 
those whose ideology score (J1) is at or below the 
median value (.152). To help uncover the systematic 
variation in the data without imposing any pattern ex 
ante, we include the fit from a nonparametric scatter 
plot smoother.12 The outstanding patterns in the data 
are clear, namely, the radical difference between cases 
in which the evidence was admitted (the top row) and 
those in which the evidence was excluded (the bottom 
row). In the former, the probability of review is zero, 
except at the very highest levels of intrusiveness, where 
it appears to increase slightly. In the latter, the proba- 
bility of review is never near zero, except for very 
intrusive searches struck down by conservative courts. 
Figure 3 uncovers another predicted pattern: The 
probability of granting certiorari as a function of 
intrusiveness is flat (or slightly increasing at high levels 
of intrusiveness) when the lower court admits the 
evidence; flat when liberal courts exclude the evidence; 
12 In each panel the smoothing curve is a locally weighted lesss) 
regression (span = 1) incorporating the Manski-Lerman weights. 
Other smoothers yield similar patterns, and the results are not 
particularly sensitive to the span of the regression. On these tech- 
niques, see Beck and Jackman 1998. 
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and strongly decreasing when conservative courts strike 
down a search. Finally, in the lower panels the esti- 
mated probabilities of granting certiorari-ranging 
from about 10% to more than 80%-are very high, in 
the context of known patterns about certiorari. For 
example, the overall probability of granting certiorari 
for search-and-seizure cases appealed to the Burger 
Court was 7%.13 
Parametric Fitting: The Signaling 
Hypotheses 
Bearing in mind that we model only one aspect of the 
certiorari process, Table 1 presents empirical tests of 
the theoretical model. As required by the theory, the 
statistical models are switching regime regressions 
(Goldfeld and Quandt 1973), which we estimate as 
logistic regressions. The regimes are the same shown in 
the critical conditioning plot in Figure 2. In models 1 
13 Data compiled by the authors from U.S. Law Week. 
and 2, the slope in the lower right-hand panel is 
estimated as a linear function of observed intrusive- 
ness; in models 3 and 4 it is estimated as a step 
function. 
In all four models, the coefficient on the variable 
admit is the intercept for cases in which the lower court 
admitted the evidence. Admit:intrude is the slope 
coefficient on the level of intrusiveness for the admitted 
cases. Across all four models, these variables have 
stable, statistically significant coefficients. It is straight- 
forward to calculate the implied probabilities of grant- 
ing certiorari, and these are shown in Figure 4 (using 
model 4). In the top two panels of that figure, the 
probability of the Supreme Court granting certiorari if 
the lower court admitted the evidence is essentially 
zero, except at the highest levels of intrusiveness, 
where it increases to about 15%. 
The patterns predicted when the lower court ex- 
cluded the evidence are more complex, and the models 
explore these patterns in some detail. In all four 
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FIGURE 3. Actual Patterns in the Data 
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models, the variable exclude is the intercept for cases 
in which the lower court excluded the evidence. In no 
model is this term statistically significantly different 
from zero, which indicates a baseline probability of 
granting certiorari for these cases of approximately 
50%. Model 1 allows the slope on intrusiveness to vary 
linearly depending on the ideology of the lower court 
(as measured by J1, the ideology of the opinion writer). 
For liberal judges (J1 ' .1) the coefficient may take one 
value; for conservative ones (J1 > .1) it may take 
another. As shown in Table 1, if the lower court was 
liberal, then the probability the Supreme Court would 
grant certiorari was not affected by the level of intru- 
siveness. But if the lower court was conservative, then 
the probability fell with the level of intrusiveness.14 
14 Although our theoretical model explicitly calls for cut-points and 
regime changes, estimating the model with the original interval-level 
measurements for lower court ideology and the intrusiveness of the 
search does not change the results. Rerunning model 1 yields the 
following equation: .046 (1.08) - 6.56 (1.68) X Upheld - 0.19 
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Model 2 is identical to model 1 but drops the 
statistically insignificant variable that allowed intrusive- 
ness to affect the probability of certiorari for cases with 
evidence excluded by a liberal court. (The insignifi- 
cance of this variable is compatible with the theory [see 
the lower left-hand panel in Figure 2].) Excluding this 
variable has only a very small effect on the overall fit of 
the model, as shown in Table 1 by the residual devi- 
ance. In model 2, the predicted behavior of the Su- 
preme Court varies dramatically depending on the 
ideology of the lower court, given exclusion of the 
evidence. If the lower court was liberal (J1 ? .1), then 
the predicted probability of granting certiorari was 
slightly more than 50% regardless of how intrusive the 
search. If the lower court was conservative (J1 > .1), 
then the probability declined dramatically with intru- 
(0.36) X Intrude + 2.01 (2.23) X Ideology + 1.13 (0.50) x 
(Upheld X Intrude) - 1.09 (0.71) X (Ideology X Intrude), with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 1. Probability of Granting Certiorari by Lower Court Decision and Intrusiveness of Search 
(Logit Models) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Admit -5.96 -5.96 -5.96 -5.96 
(1.27) (1.27) (1.27) (1.27) 
(-4.7) (-4.7) (-4.7) (-4.7) 
Admit:intrude 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
(2.1) (2.1) (2.1) (2.1) 
Exclude 0.38 0.08 0.14 -0.01 
(1.03) (0.62) (1.06) (0.62) 
(0.4) (0.1) (0.1) (-0.02) 
(Exclude & liberal):lntrude -0.14 -0.07 
(0.38) (0.39) 
(-0.4) (-0.2) 
(Exclude & conserv.):intrude -0.58 -0.49 
(0.36) (0.26) 
(-1.6) (-1.9) 
Step down (step at intrude = 1) -1.72 -1.57 
(1.25) (0.92) 
(-1.4) (-1.7) 
Residual deviance 61.8 61.9 62.9 62.9 
Degrees of freedom 268 269 268 269 
Note: In all cases, the dependent variable is the probability of granting certiorari. Standard error is given in first parenthesis, t value in second parenthesis. 
siveness, falling to less than 10% for very intrusive 
searches.15 
Models 3 and 4 more directly test the theoretical 
model by forcing the relationship in the lower right- 
hand panel of the conditioning plots in Figure 2 to take 
the form of a step function. We place the step at 
intrude = 1 (similar results obtain when the step is 
placed anywhere in the range 0-4). The step "down" 
from the intercept is given in Table 1. Model 3, like 
model 1, allows the probability of certiorari, given 
exclusion by a liberal lower court, to vary with the 
intrusiveness of the search. But as in model 1, this 
variable is not statistically significantly different from 
zero. Model 4 drops this term. Model 4 fits the data 
only negligibly worse than models 1 and 2 (residual 
deviance = 62.9). 
The fit from model 4 is shown in Figure 4. As noted 
above, the predicted probability of granting certiorari 
for most upheld cases is zero and for liberal lower 
courts that excluded the evidence is about 50%. As 
shown in the lower left-hand panel of Figure 4, this 
constant probability can now be seen as the upper step 
in a step function. Among more conservative lower 
courts that excluded the evidence (the lower right-hand 
panel), the probability of review remains at about 50% 
for less intrusive searches (the upper step in the step 
function). For more intrusive searches, the probability 
falls to about 18% (the lower step in the step function). 
15 The results are not sensitive to the exact location of the break 
between more liberal and less liberal lower courts, that is, the results 
are similar if the break falls anywhere between 0 and .3 on the 
ideology scale. 
Discussion 
The patterns revealed by the statistical analysis and 
shown in Figure 4 strongly resemble those predicted by 
the signaling model. The dramatic difference between 
the top and bottom rows in the figure confirms the 
"Nixon goes to China principle." The more subtle 
predictions, involving the location of the step, are 
consistent with the lower panels. 
Two discrepancies deserve brief discussion. First, 
among cases in which the lower court admitted the 
evidence, the probability of review rises slightly at the 
highest levels of intrusiveness. If some of the lower 
courts were more conservative than the Supreme 
Court, then the model predicts this should not com- 
pletely escape review for very intrusive searches. The 
presence of some courts like this, or variables outside 
the model, could account for the slight increase in 
review probabilities at high levels of intrusiveness after 
admission of the evidence. Second, the lower step in 
the step function does not rest on zero but is located 
somewhat higher. If more liberal courts are mistakenly 
measured as less liberal, then this measurement error 
(as well as variables outside the model) could lead to 
an increase in the measured value for the lower step. 
CONCLUSION 
Our signaling theory of the Supreme Court's certiorari 
decisions was tested against a random sample of cases 
heard in the federal appellate courts. The theory is an 
incomplete view of the process: It emphasizes the role 
of certiorari in enforcing the doctrinal preferences of 
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FIGURE 4. Parametric Fit to the Data 
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the Supreme Court throughout the judicial hierarchy 
but ignores its important role in the evolutionary 
creation of doctrine. The data are far from perfect. For 
example, we rely on fairly crude measures of judicial 
ideology and a relatively coarse coding of fact patterns 
in the cases. Despite these shortcomings, which ought 
to militate against finding patterns in the data, our 
analysis uncovers considerable support for the signal- 
ing theory as well as support for a variety of new 
propositions. Of course, we tested our model in only 
one area of decision making during the reign of one 
chief justice. Whether the data fit the model in other 
areas and during other regimes remains to be seen. 
Our research makes three contributions. First, we 
use a formal model to advance our substantive under- 
standing of certiorari. Most of the patterns uncovered 
here are new, despite the extensive research on the 
subject. We believe it unlikely that an analyst would 
uncover the patterns shown in figures 3 and 4 without 
a formal signaling model. Second, the research inte- 
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grates the study of the judicial hierarchy with the "new 
economics of organization" (Moe 1984). The applica- 
tion of formal principal-agent theory to the judicial 
hierarchy yields several benefits, both within the field 
of judicial politics and, more broadly, for the study of 
political hierarchies. Within the field of judicial poli- 
tics, two phenomena, hitherto regarded as distinct, 
emerge as two components of a single underlying 
process that can be analyzed in a unified way. The two 
phenomena are judicial compliance (the responsive- 
ness of lower courts to changes in the doctrinal direc- 
tives of higher courts) and certiorari; both can be 
treated as interactive components in a political struggle 
over doctrine within the judicial hierarchy. From this 
perspective, the problem of doctrinal control in the 
judiciary is not sui generis but a particularly interesting 
case of an issue common to rule-governed hierarchies. 
To underscore the point, our model of strategic audit- 
ing, although tailored to the certiorari process, has 
broader applicability to other hierarchical settings in 
American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 1 
which players have political preferences about rules. 
Third, the research provides empirical support for a 
formal model, which is still in relatively short supply. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Part 1 (x*X does not exist). Note that the case deals with 
F(tb) - F(ta)/l - F(ta) < k V x. F(tb) - F(ta)/1 - 
F(ta) > k V x cannot arise because lim., F(tb) - 
F(ta)/l - F(ta) = 0. This is true because ta, tb - -o as x 
-> oo. Thus, F(ta), F(tb) -> 0 and 1 - F(ta) -> 1 as 
->o, 
and the quotient goes to zero. For any nonzero k there must 
exist a sufficiently large x so that F(tb) - F(ta)/l - F(ta) < 
k. (A) Existence. If H does not review any cases, then the 
indicated strategy for L is clearly a best response. By 
assumption, F(tb) - F(ta)/1 - F(ta) < k V x when s(t, x) = 
1 V X E [XL, XH). Then, from equation 2, r(exclude, x) = 0 
V x. That r(admit; x) = 0 V x is discussed in the text. (B) 
Uniqueness. There are three cases to consider, none of which 
can be an equilibrium. (1) The indicated strategy for L, but 
H reviews at least one case with probability greater than zero. 
By construction, H can profitably deviate to the indicated 
strategy. (2) The indicated strategy for H, but L deviates in 
some fashion from deciding cases according to its preferred 
rule. Then there are cases where L can profitably deviate to 
the indicated strategy. (3) H reviews some cases with proba- 
bility greater than zero, and L deviates from deciding cases 
according to its preferred rule for at least one case in the 
conflict region (i.e., ] x E [XL, XH) s't. s(t, x) < 1) 
(deviations from the indicated strategy for L are never 
profitable for cases below XL or above XH [inclusive] and need 
not be considered further). By construction, the Bayesian 
posterior >(XL C X C XH, exclude, x) < k when s(t, x) = 1 
V X E [XL, XH). But >(XL C X C XH, exclude, x) decreases 
when s(t, x) < 1 for some x in the conflict region. Thus, 
(XL C X ? XH, exclude, x) remains less than k when s(t, 
x) < 1 for some x in the conflict region, and therefore H can 
profitably deviate to the strategy indicated in the proposition. 
Part 2 (x* exists). By inspection, the strategies characterized 
in part 2 comprise best responses: s * (t, x) is compatible with 
BRL(r(m; x), t; x), and r*(mni, x) is compatible with 
equation 2 and the requirement that r(m2, x) = 0 V x (the 
latter is explained in the text). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Follows immediately from proposition 1. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Hypothesis 3 
(a) We consider the case in which XL < XH; via symmetry, 
similar arguments apply when XL > XH. Recall that x* is 
defined implicitly by equation 3. The partial derivative of 
equation 3 with respect to xV is 
f(ta) ( - F(tb)) f(tb)(l - F(ta)) k 
(F(ta) -F(tb) )2 1 - k 
which will be nonzero provided 
f(ta) f(tb) 
1 
-F(tj) 1 -F(tb) 
that is, the hazard rate at ta is not equal to the hazard rate at 
tb. A necessary condition for this is that XL 7& XH, which will 
also be sufficient provided F displays the monotone hazard 
rate property (MHRP) (under MHRP, if t' > t, then the 
hazard rate at t' is greater than the hazard rate at t), as 
assumed. Then, via the implicit function theorem, 
ax* as as f(ta)[I - F(tb)] 
OXL aXL ax* f(ta)[ 1 - F(tb)] - f(tb)[ 1 - F(ta)] 
The numerator is positive. From the definitions of ta and tb, 
XH > XL => tb > ta, which, using MHRP, in turn implies the 
denominator is negative. (b) is obvious given (a). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Hypothesis 4 
The argument is similar to that of hypothesis 3. Again 
considering the case in which XL < XH, via the implicit 
function theorem, 
Of) as as f(tb)[l - F(ta)] 
OXH JXH ax - f(tb) [I - F(tj) f(tq) [ 1 - F(tb) 0 
using MHRP. The other case follows via symmetry. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Hypothesis 5 
As in hypotheses 4 and 5. For XL < XH 
ax* as as 
Ok Ok ax * 
[1 -F(ta)][F(tb) -F(ta)] 0 
-f(t,)II - F(tj) ] - f(tb)[k(1 - k) + F(tj) , 
as the denominator is negative (provided 0 < k ? 1), and 
the numerator is positive. The other case follows from 
symmetry. Q.E.D. 
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